On the Determination of the Public Debt by Barro, Robert J.
 
On the Determination of the Public Debt
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Barro, Robert J. 1979. On the determination of the public
debt. Journal of Political Economy 87(5): 940-971.
Published Version doi:10.1086/260807
Accessed February 18, 2015 6:11:44 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451400
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's
DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and
conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAOn the  Determination  of the  Public Debt 
Robert  J. Barro 
University  of Rochester 
A public debt theory is constructed  in which the Ricardian invariance 
theorem  is  valid  as  a  first-order  proposition  but  where  the  de- 
pendence  of  excess  burden  on  the  timing  of  taxation  implies  an 
optimal  time path of debt issue. A central  proposition  is that deficits 
are varied in order  to maintain expect ed constancy in tax rates. This 
behavior  implies  a  positive  effect  on  debt  issue  of  temporary  in- 
creases  in  government  spending  (as in  wartime)  a countercyclical 
response  of debt to temporary  income  movements,  and a one-to-one 
effect  of  expected  inflation  on  nominal  debt  growth.  Debt  issue 
would  be  invariant  with  the  outstanding  debt-income  ratio  and, 
except  for a minor  effect,  with  the  level  of  government  spending. 
Hypotheses  are  tested  on  U.S. data since  World  WXar  1. Results are 
basically in accord Fith the theory.  It also turns out that a small set of 
explanatory variables  can account for the principal movements in 
interest-bearing  federal debt since the 1920s. 
In a previous  paper  (Barro  1974) I discussed  the "Ricardian'  equiva- 
lence  theorem  on  public  debt'-that  is,  the  proposition  that  shifts 
between  debt  and tax finance  for a given  amount  of public expendi- 
ture would  have no first-order effect  on the real interest rate, volume 
of private investment,  etc. This theorem  surely remains controversial, 
although  it seems  to be evolving  into a respectable  viewpoint.  In any 
event,  proponents  of the Ricardian view that the choice between  debt 
This  research  is  being  supported  by  the  National  Science  Foundation.  I  have 
benefited  from  comments  by  Paul  Evans,  Milton  Friedman,  Bob  Hall,  Elhanan 
Helpman,  Michael Parkin, John  Shoven,  David Starrett, George  Stigler, and C. C. von 
WeizsAcker. 
I I am grateful  to Buchanan  (1976)  for pointing  out that I was discussing  this topic. 
The  Ricardian  equivalence  proposition  is  presented  in  Ricardo  (195la,  1951b)  and 
discussed  in Buchanan  (1958,  chaps.  4 and  8).  See  O'Driscoll  (1977)  for  an amusing 
discussion  of  whether  Ricardo  actually  held  to the  Ricardian  view. 
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and taxes does  not matter are left with an embarrassing  absence  of a 
theory  of  public debt creation.-  This  paper  develops  a simple  theory 
of  "optimal'  public  finance  that  identifies  some  factors  that  would 
influence  the choice between  taxes and debt issue. The  model  accepts 
the  Ricardian  invariance  theorem  as  a valid  first-order  proposition 
but  introduces  some  second-order  considerations  involving  the  "ex- 
cess burden" of taxation  to obtain a determinate  (optimal) amount  of 
debt  creation.  It  should  be  stressed  that  some  typical  features  of 
public  debt  analysis,  such  as  shifting  of  the  tax  burden  to  future 
generations,  crowding  out of private investment,  etc., are excluded  by 
the  assumption  that  the  Ricardian  proposition  is valid  on  the  first 
order.  Hence,  the  analysis  concentrates  on  less  familiar  issues  that 
would  be dominated  by the  usual  first-order  effects-if  these  effects 
were,  in  fact,  pertinent  to  the  choice  between  debt  and  taxes. 
The  theoretical  model  is used to formulate  several testable proposi- 
tions  concerning  the  determination  of  public  debt  issue.  Principal 
hypotheses  involve  the  positive  effect  on  debt  issue  of  temporary 
increases  in  government  spending  (especially  important  during  war 
and  postwar  periods),  the  negative  effect  of  temporary  increases  in 
income-that  is, a countercyclical  response  of  debt  issue,  and  a one- 
to-one  effect  of  the  expected  inflation  rate  on  the  growth  rate  of 
nominal  debt.  The  theory  also  implies  that  the  growth  rate of  debt 
would be independent  of the debt-income  ratio and would be affected 
at most  in a minor  way by the  level  of  government  expenditure. 
The  hypotheses  are tested using the time-series  data on public debt 
issue in the United  States since World War I. The  results are basically 
in accord  with the  underlying  theory.  In particular,  the  relation  be- 
tween  debt  issue and a small set of explanatory  variables seems  to be 
reasonably  stable  since  World  War  I.  However,  the  magnitude  of 
countercyclical  debt response  is significantly  larger  than that implied 
by the  theory.  Although  this  phenomenon  does  not  seem  to  be  of 
recent  origin,  it does  suggest  that some  additional  element-such  as 
governmental  attempts  at  stabilization  policy-would  be  needed  to 
account  for  this  behavior. 
A  Model  of  Public  Debt  Issue 
The  model  applies  to a large  national  government  that  has jurisdic- 
tion  over  a  population  of  exogenous  size.  The  analysis  therefore 
neglects  any effects  of  public debt  policy on  migration,  which  would 
be an important  consideration  for  a local government.  The  govern- 
2  However,  oppnerlnts  of the Ricardian view seem  also to lack an interesting  positive 
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ment  is assumed  to  finance  its expenditures  through  two  methods: 
current  taxation  and  public  debt  issue.  I do  not  deal  here  with cur- 
rency issue, although  for some  purposes  this type of finance could  be 
included  as one  form  of  current  taxation.  The  composition  of  taxes, 
by type or degree  of graduation,  is taken as given. The  volume  of real 
government  expenditure,  aside from interest  payments  on the public 
debt,  during  period  t is denoted  by Gt and  is assumed  to be  exoge- 
nous.  Hence,  the  present  analysis does  not deal  with the  determina- 
tion  of  the size of  the  public  sector.  Future  values  of G and of  other 
exogenous  variables are treated  as though  known with certainty.  Real 
tax revenue  obtained  by the government  in each period  is designated 
by T1, and aggregate  real income  (treated as exogenous)  by Yt. The  real 
stock of public debt outstanding  at the end of period t is denoted  by bt, 
where  this  debt  can  be  assumed  at  this  stage  to  take  the  form  of 
one-period,  single-coupon  bonds  that  are  issued  at  par.  I  assume 
initially that the price level, P,  is (and is expected  to be) constant  over 
time,  and  the  real  (=nominal)  rate  of  return  on  public  and  private 
debts, r, is also a constant.3 The  government's  budget  equation  in each 
period  is 
G, +  rbt-1  -,Tt +  (bt -  bt1),  (1) 
where  interest  payments  during  period t are assumed  to apply to the 
stock of  debt  outstanding  at the  beginning  of  the  period. 
The  government's  budget  equation  at each date t, together  with an 
additional  condition  that rules out perpetual  debt finance,  implies the 
overall  budget  constraint, 
[GtI(l  + r)t] + bo =  E  [Ttl(l + r)t].  (2) 
l  l 
This  condition-which  equates  the  present  value  of  government  ex- 
penditure  (aside from interest  payments)  plus initial debt to the pres- 
ent  value  of  taxes-follows  from  equation  (1)  as  long  as b is  con- 
strained  to grow  asymptotically  at a rate below  r.4 
3  Implicit in this condition  is the assumption  that the required  real rate of return  on 
public debt, relative to that on private debt, is invariant with the quantity of government 
debt  outstanding.  If  the  quantity  of  public  debt  approaches  the  government's 
collateral-in  the sense of the present  value of its future  taxing capacity-then  the risk 
of  the government's  default  would  have to be taken into account  (see Barro  1976b, p. 
343).  Alternatively,  if  government  debt  were  perceived  as net  wealth  by  the  private 
sector,  then  the quantity  of  debt  could  influence  real rates of  return  in the  economy 
(see,  e.g.,  Barro  1974,  p.  1096). 
4  In the efficient  case where r exceeds  the growth  rate of real income,  this condition 
requires  a bound  on  the asymptotic  debt-income  ratio (see Barro  1976b, pp.  343-45). 
Presumably,  this  ratio cannot,  in  fact, exceed  the  finite  value  implied  by the  govern- 
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The  sum of the present  value of government  expenditures  and the 
initial debt level, which appears  on the left side of equation  (2) and is 
exogenously  given,  determines  the  present  value  of  government  tax 
receipts.  However,  the fixity of this last present  value leaves open  the 
determination  of the time pattern of taxes. It is assumed  that taxation 
involves  not  only  a one-to-one  transfer  of  purchasing  power  from 
individuals  to the  government  but  also some  collection  costs  and/or 
indirect  misallocation  costs that are imposed  on the private economy. 
That  is, the  "production" of  government  revenue  involves  the  using 
up of some resources  in the sense of costs that are often  referred  to as 
"deadweight  losses" or "excess burdens." For a given  present  value of 
net tax revenues  (as fixed  by the  present  value  of  expenditures  and 
the  initial  debt  level),  the  present  value  of  these  extra  costs  would 
generally  depend  on the distribution  of taxes by type and timing. The 
present  analysis, which focuses  on the timing of taxes, abstracts from 
the determination  of  tax composition  at a point  in time.  Essentially, 
the  analysis of  timing  is conditional  on  the selection  of  an  'optimal" 
tax  composition  that  underlies  the  'production  function"  relation 
between  net tax receipts and "excess burden" that is specified  below. 
For the  case of  direct  collection  costs  for administration,  enforce- 
ment, and so on, let Z, represent  the real cost incurred  and Yt the real 
national income  in period t.5 I assume  that Z, depends  positively, with 
a positive second  derivative,  on the total net tax take for the period Tt 
and  negatively  on  the  pool  of  contemporaneously  taxable  resources 
Yi, but not on the values of taxes or incomes in other periods.  Further, 
I neglect  any special relation  of collection  costs to the contemporane- 
ous government  spending  level G,." Finally, I assume the homogeneity 
condition  that a doubling  of  net  tax collections  Tf  and  potential  tax 
pool Yt  doubles  the collection  cost Z,. Therefore,  the collection cost for 
period  t can be  written  as 
Zt  =  F(rt,  Yt)  =-Tf(rtlY),  (3) 
wheref'  >  0, and the functions  is assumed  to be invariant over time. 
The  present  value  of  collection  costs  is then  given  by 
Z  =  >j7tf(Tt/Yt)/(1  +  r)t.  (4) 
t=I 
I have not included  the collection  costs as components  of government  spending  in 
eq.  (1),  although  the  analysis could  be  altered  in  that  manner  without  affecting  any 
substantive results. Independence  of national income  levels from the choice  of the time 
path  of  taxes  is  assumed  to  hold  as  a  first-order  approximation-essentially,  the 
deadweight  losses from taxation are assumed  to constitute  only a small fraction of GNP. 
6 Such  an effect  might  arise if, e.g.,  the influence  of  war on  "patriotism" lowers  the 
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At the  present  time  (date  1) the  government  is confronted  by an 
exogenous  series of planned  expenditures,  G,  G2,  . . .,  which it must 
finance at each date; by a series of (anticipated)  real income values, Y1, 
Y2,  . . .;  the interest rate r; and an initial stock of debt, b(?.  The  overall 
budget  condition  in  equation  (2)  fixes  the  present  value  of  net  tax 
collections.  Given  this  present  value,  the  government's  objective  is 
taken  to  be  the  minimization  of  the  present  value  of  the  resources 
consumed  by  the  process  of  revenue  generation,  Z,  as  shown  in 
equation  (4). This  general  form  of  the objective  is similar to ones  set 
up  by Prescott  (1977)  and  Barro  (1976a). 
The  assumed  objective  of  the  government-that  it pursues  a cost- 
minimization  policy  involving  the  economization  of  revenue-raising 
costs-can  be reconciled  with various  models  of  public sector  behav- 
ior.  For  example,  the  setup  seems  consistent  with  a  public-interest 
theory of government,  with a model  of self-interested  politicians who 
are  subject  to  "effective"  electoral  control,  and  with  a  model  of  a 
political dictator who  maximizes  own utility. The  objective would  not 
seem  to  apply  if  the  institutional  structure  were  such  that  "political 
income" was directly related  to the amount  of deadweight  loss gener- 
ated  by the  government. 
The  government's  optimization  problem amounts to choosingTi,  T2, 
.  , to minimize  the present  value of revenue-raising  costs, subject to 
the  form of  the cost function  in equation  (4) and  the  overall  budget 
constraint  in equation  (2). The  resulting  first-order conditions,  which 
can be obtained  in the usual manner,  require  the marginal collection 
cost for raising taxes-9Z,/0r-to  be the same in all periods  (without 
regard  to  the  value  of  r,  because  tax  revenue  and  the  associated 
collection cost arise at the same point in time). With the homogeneous 
specification  of costs in equation  (4), these  conditions  require  the tax 
rate, ilY,  to be equal  in all periods.  The  (planned)  constancy  of  this 
ratio is the key to the subsequent  analysis.7  Given that the tax-income 
The  choice  of taxes over  time  can also be considered  in terms of  an objective  that 
encompasses  distortion  costs on the  private economy.  I have considered  only a simple 
model  in which the  representative  individual  receives  utility from  leisure  and a single 
consumption  good  in  each  period,  where  any  satisfaction  provided  by  government 
services in various  periods  is separable  from  the utility provided  by consumption  and 
leisure, where interest income  is untaxed,  and where the present  values of all producer 
prices are constant. This constancy  would obtain if production  were subject to constant 
returns to scale (which means that the model does not deal with capital accumulation  in 
a serious  way) and  if the interest  rate were fixed.  One justification  for the latter would 
be a small-country  setting  in which the domestic  interest rate was tied to the exogenous 
return  available internationally.  The  optimal  taxation  literature,  as in Sandmo  (1974) 
and Sadka (1977),  can then  be applied  to determine  the time  pattern  of consumption 
and leisure  taxes that maximizes  the  utility of  the representative  individual,  given  the 
present  value  of  tax  collections.  E.g.,  for  the  case  where  leisure  in  each  period  is 
untaxed,  uniform  consumption  taxation  over time emerges  if the compensated  elastic- 
ity of  consumer  demand  in  period  i  with  respect  to  the  present-value  wage  for  any DETERMINATION  OF  PUBLIC  DEBT  945 
ratio is constant,  the level of taxes in each  period  is determined  from 
the given  values  of  (Y,  . ..  ), (GI, . . .), r, and b(, in order  to conform 
with the overall budget  condition  set out in equation  (2). These  values 
for  taxes  imply  values  for  the  government  deficit  in  each  period, 
bt -  bt1,  in accordance  with equation  (1). The  properties  of the solu- 
tion are illustrated below for particular specifications of the time paths 
of  Y and G. 
Constant Income and Government  Expenditure 
If Y is constant  over time, the constancy  of nrY  implies constancy  of r. 
If G is also constant,  the  level  of  T  is determined  immediately  from 
equation  (2), which specializes  here  to G/r  +  bo = nir, so that r = G + 
rb(.  It  follows  from  equation  (1)  that  the  government's  budget  is 
always in balance-that  is, b,  = bt_  =  b()  for all t. A notable  aspect  of 
this solution  is that the initial debt is not amortized.  The  steady-state 
value  of  public debt  is determined  entirely  by its initial value  rather 
than as a function of G, Y, r, or the form of the collection cost function, 
f,  in equation  (3). A related implication  is that the government  deficit, 
b,-  b1,  is determined  (to equal zero) independently  of the values of 
bo,  G, Y, r, or the form of thef-function.  This type of result continues 
to  apply  when  complications  are  introduced  into  the  specified  time 
paths of  G and  Y. 
Constant Rate of Growth  of Income and Government  Expenditure 
Suppose  now that aggregate  real income  grows at the constant  rate p, 
so that Yt =  YO(I  + p)t. In order for the present value of future  income 
to be finite (i.e., to be in the efficient  case referred  to in n. 4 above), it 
must be that r >  p.  Government  expenditure  is assumed  to grow  at 
rate y, so that Gt =  G0(  1 + y)t.  In order  for GIY <  I to hold at all times, 
it must be that y  p <  r.8 Clearly, p = y is the only specification within 
period j is independent  of  the index  i. (The  results  from  Sandmo  [p. 705,  eq. 22] and 
Sadka  [p.  389,  eq.  81 can  be  extended  to  obtain  this  conclusion.)  Essentially,  this 
condition rulesoutany  special relationshipofcomplementarity  orsubstitutability between 
leisure  at date i and  consumption  at various  dates-which  would  be  violated  if,  e.g., 
contemporaneous  leisure were a strong complement  for consumption.  Sandmo's analy- 
sis [p.  705,  eq.  24]  implies  that  the  desired  condition  obtains  if the  utility  function  is 
weakly separable  between  work and  consumption  and  homogeneous  in consumption 
goods  (so that the income  elasticities for consumption  at various dates are equal).  More 
generally,  it seems that approximate  constancy  of optimal  tax rates would hold if leisure 
at one date were a close substitute  for leisure  at other  dates and if consumption  at one 
date were  a close  substitute  for consumption  at other  dates.  See  Kydland and Prescott 
(1978,  p.  18) on  this  point. 
8  However,  it is clear  empirically  that y  >  p can  prevail  for  long  periods.  E.g.,  for 
the  United  States  from  1890  to  1976  the  average  growth  rate of  real  GNP  was 3.1 
percent  per  year,  while  that of  real  federal  expenditure  was 5.8  percent  per  year. 946  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
the constant  growth rate setup that allows for a positive,  finite steady- 
state value of GIY. However,  examination  of results for cases where p 
$ y  is permitted  provides  qualitative  insights  into  more  complicated 
situations where differences  between p and y prevail over finite inter- 
vals. 
Since the tax-income  ratio is still constant  in the optimal  solution  it 
follows that taxes grow at the same rate as income-that  is, rt  =(  1 + 
p)'. Using the budget  condition  of equation  (2) leads eventually  to the 
result,  Ta  =  [(r -  p)/(l  + p)][G(1  + y)/(r -  y) + by, which can be used 
to determine  the value of taxes at any date. Using T  =  r0( 1 +  p), G  = 
G,(l  +  y),  and  the  government  budget  condition  in  equation  (1) 
implies  that  the  deficit  in  the  current  period  is 
b-  bo = pbo +  [(p -  y)I(r -  y)]G1.  (5) 
For the  case  where  income  and  government  expenditure  grow  at a 
common  rate, p =  y, the conclusion  from  this extension  is that (real) 
government  debt also grows at this rate-(b1  -  bo)lb =  p-rather  than 
remaining  constant  over  time.  It is now  the  ratio of  debt  to income, 
blY, that remains  fixed  at its initial value, b0IYo.  The  model  therefore 
retains  the  property  that  the  debt-income  ratio  is  not  determined 
within  the  model  (by  the  values  of  GIY, r,  p,  or  the  form  of  the 
f-function)  but  is rather  fixed  at its historically  given  "initial" value. 
For p $ y an additional  effect  is that the current  deficit rises with p 
and  falls with y  (for a given  value  of  current  government  spending, 
G1). When  p exceeds  y,  future  values  of GIY will be  lower  than  the 
current  value.  Consequently,  the  financing  of  expenditure  becomes 
easier  over  time-in  the  sense  of  a  diminished  relative  collection 
cost-so  that the  deferral  of  taxation  is warranted.  This  deferral  of 
taxation  corresponds  to  current  deficit  finance,  as  reflected  in  the 
higher  value  of b,  -  bo.9 
Transitory  Income and Government  Expenditure 
An empirically important  extension  to the model concerns  temporary 
departures  of  government  spending  or  aggregate  income  from 
'normal"  values. This analysis applies especially to the role of wartime 
expenditures  and  depressions-both  viewed  as  transitory  phenom- 
ena-in  the  government  debt  creation  process. 
I In terms of the growth rate of b, the division of eq. (5) by bo indicates  that the extra 
term is [(p  -  y)I(r -  y)](GI/b)). If p >  y, b grows faster than G over time, and the ratio 
Glb,-,  approaches  zero.  Hence,  the asymptotic growth rate of b would still be p (and the 
asymptotic  value  of  GIY would  be  zero).  Of  course,  if p  <  y, GIY would  approach 
infinity,  which would be a meaningless  result. The  main interest  in the (p -  y) term in 
eq. (5) would  arise in situations  where p  A  y applies over some  finite period,  but not in 
the  steady  state.  The  result  for  this  more  complicated  situation  would  correspond 
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Suppose  that current  government  expenditure  departs  by a frac- 
tion E from its trend value-that  is, G1 =  (1 + E)Go(l + p), and that the 
current  value  of  income  differs  from  its trend  value  by the  fraction 
u-that  is,  Y1 =  (1  +  u)Yo(l  +  p),  where  Go and  Y() are  assumed 
(defined)  to be  along  the  respective  trend  lines.  For convenience,  I 
deal  here  with a case  where  the  trend  growth  rates of  G and  Y are 
equal, since the main effect  of unequal  growth rates is brought  out in 
equation  (5). The  expected  departure  of G from  trend  is assumed  to 
persist (by the fraction e) fork  periods,  while the departure  of Y from 
trend  is assumed  to  persist  (by the  fraction  u)  for n  periods.10 This 
specification  could  be generalized  in obvious  ways-for  example,  by 
altering  the assumption  that the anticipated  fractional  departures  of 
G and Y away from  trend,  E and u, were  precisely constant  over k and 
n  periods,  respectively.  However,  the  present  setup  brings  out  two 
significant elements:  first, the role of the magnitude  of the departure 
of  current  G and Y from  trend  and,  second,  the  impact  of  the  per- 
ceived  duration  of  departures  from  trend. 
Optimal  public  finance  still requires  a constant  (planned)  ratio of 
taxes  to income  at all points  in time.  Accordingly,  from  date n  +  1 
onward,  planned  taxes  still grow along  with income  at rate p.  How- 
ever,  because  of  the  transitory  (+  or  -)  income  over  the  first  n 
periods,  the taxes over this interval depart from trend by the factor,  1 
+  u.  Using  these  facts  and  the  budget  condition  of  equation  (2)- 
which now includes  the transitory government  spending  over the first 
k periods-it  is possible  to determine  taxes at all points  in time. The 
solution  can  be written  in the  form 
Tt = [1/(l  + u)1T (I1  + P)"  for t  =n +  1, n + 2,. 
(t =  T10  +  u)t-l  Or  =-1  ...  , n,  (6) 
-  [ 
+ 
+ po(l  (  + p) +  (r -  p)bo 
+  EG0(1 + p){l  -  [(1 +  p)I(1 + r)]l}). 
The  above expression  for m,  derived  from the government's  budget 
constraint  in equation  (2), can be interpreted  as follows.  The  term in 
the  right-hand  parentheses  measures  the  "permanent"  level  of  re- 
quired  finance-the  trend  value of expenditures,  G0(1 +  p),  plus the 
interest on the initial debt less the part that is financed by issue of debt 
along  with the  trend  growth  of  income,  (r -  p)bo, plus  the  effect  of 
transitory expenditures.  This  last item is the amount  of current  tran- 
sitory expenditure,  EGO(  1 + p), multiplied  by a factor that accounts  for 
duration.  As k  > 0 (see n. 10 above) this factor approaches  zero-that 
10 Although  k and n must formally be integers  within the present discrete  framework, 
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is, purely transitory current  government  expenditure  has no effect  on 
current  taxation. As k -x  o  the factor approaches  unity (assuming r < 
p)-signifying  that  the  "transitory"  component  of  government 
spending  amounts  in this case to permanent  expenditure.  Generally, 
the  higher  the expected  duration  of a given  amount  of current  tran- 
sitory  government  spending,  the larger  the  amount  of  current  taxa- 
tion. 
The  other  term  on  the  right  side  of  equation  (6)  accounts  for 
transitory  income.  If  the  duration,  n,  of  the  departure  of  current 
income  from trend were close to zero, then TI would be a multiple,  1 + 
u, of  the  permanent  level  of  finance  (in order  to equate  the  current 
tax-income  ratio to the future  ratio). As n increases,  the length  of the 
period  for  which  taxes  will depart  from  trend  by the  factor  (1  +  u) 
rises, which  (if u  is positive)  diminishes  the  required  amount  of  cur- 
rent taxation. As n  x>  , the multiplication  of trend income  by (1 + u) 
becomes  permanent,  so that the first term on  the right side of equa- 
tion  (6)  approaches  unity  (assuming  r  >  p).  In  this  situation  taxes 
correspond  to the permanent  level of  finance at all times rather than 
being  multiplied  by (I  + u) over an interval of finite length  n. Gener- 
ally, current taxes are an increasing function  of the amount of current 
transitory income,  as measured  by (1 +  u), and a decreasing  function 
of  the  anticipated  duration,  n,  of  this transitory  income. 
With current  taxes determined  from equation  (6), the current  gov- 
ernment  deficit follows from the budget  condition  in equation  (1) as b, 
- b(  -=  Cy  I + rbo -T,  =- [(I1 +  p )I(I  +  r  )]k[E6(;  1  +  p  )] 
- 
[(I1  +  p  )/(  l  + 
r)]n[GO(1  +  p)  +  rbo]u +  pbo, where  the  approximation  involves  ne- 
glecting  the term, u [(l  +  p)I(l  + r)]n', relative to 1. Letting  G  G0  (1  + 
p) be the trend  value of current  government  spending  and Y1  =  YO(l 
+  p)  be  the  trend  value  of  current  income,  the  solution  can  be 
rewritten  from  the  definitions  of  E and u as b-  bo  [(1  +  p)I(l  + 
r)]k(GI  -  G1) -  [(1 + p)/(l  + r)](G61 + rbo)[(Yi -  Yl)/Yf] + pbo, or, in 
growth  rate terms, 
(b1 -  bo)/b0  [(1 + p)/(l  + r)]k(Gt  -  )/b 
-  [(1 + p)I(I  + r)]1[(G1 + rbo)/boj[(Y1  -  Yl)1Y1]  + p.  (7) 
The  growth  rate  of  debt  in  equation  (7) departs  from  the  trend 
income  growth  rate, p, in accordance  with the value of two variables. 
The  first variable is the departure  of  current  government  spending 
from normal, G,  -  G,  relative to the initial debt level. The  coefficient 
of  this  variable,  [(I  +  p)I(l  +  r)]k,  would  be  unity  if  the  "extra" 
expenditure  were entirely transitory (k = 0), less than unity (since r > 
p)  if  the  duration  were  finite,  and  would  approach  zero  as k  ap- 
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actually represent  a departure  of spending  from normal). The  second 
variable is the  proportional  deviation  of  income  from  normal,  (Y1 - 
Y,)1Y1, multiplied  by  the  normal  level  of  government  expenditure 
(including  interest  payments  on  the initial debt)  relative  to the initial 
debt. The  coefficient  of this variable, [(1 + p)l(1  + r)]n, would be unity 
if  departures  of  income  from  normal  (booms  and  recessions)  were 
entirely  transitory (n  = 0), less than unity if this duration  were finite, 
and  would  approach  zero  as n  approaches  infinity.  If  k and  n  are 
viewed  as constants-that  is, if systematic  effects  on  perceived  dura- 
tion of  transitory government  expenditure  or transitory  income  can- 
not be isolated-then  the  principal  hypotheses  derivable  from  equa- 
tion (7) are that the (G, -  G,) variable has a coefficient  that is positive 
but less than one,  while the (Y, -  Y1)/Y,  variable has a coefficient  that 
is  negative  but  less  than  one  in  magnitude.  If  the  durations  are 
themselves  on  the order  of  2-5  years (corresponding  roughly  to the 
periods of business cycles and wars) and if the excess of r over p is in a 
range  of  1-2  percent  per  year,  then  the  magnitude  of  both 
coefficients  is close  to  one.  For example,  if r  =  5  percent  per  year 
(recall that r is a real rate of return) and p = 3.5 percent  per year, then 
a horizon  (k or n)  of  2 years implies  a coefficient  magnitude  of  0.97, 
while a horizon  of  5 years implies  a coefficient  magnitude  of  0.93.11 
The  response  of  the  deficit  to  the  income  term  in  equation  (7) 
corresponds  partly  to  the  "automatic  stabilizer"  property  of  a  tax 
system by which  revenues  rise and the deficit  falls with income  for a 
given set of tax laws.'2 These  income-induced  changes  in tax revenues 
(and also in some  components  of federal  expenditure)  are, in princi- 
ple,  filtered  out  in  the  construction  of  a "full-employment  surplus" 
(see  U.S.  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  [1962,  pp.  78-81]  for  a 
discussion  of this concept).  However,  the present  analysis would  also 
incorporate  changes  in the  tax "structure"-which  would  usually  be 
labeled  as "discretionary" fiscal changes-that  are  a response  to  in- 
come fluctuations.  Further, the present  model rationalizes a system of 
tax laws that allows for an automatic procyclical pattern of revenues  as 
a  convenient  mechanism  for  stabilizing  the  tax-income  ratio.  This 
" The  model  can  also  be  used  to  analyze  the  effect  of  anticipated  future  blips  in 
government  expenditure  or  income.  Current  taxes  and,  hence,  the  current  deficit 
would be affected  here only to the extent  that these anticipated  future departures  from 
normal have a substantial duration.  The  effects  can be illustrated by the (p -  y) term in 
eq. (5) from the model  in which the trend growth rates of Y (p) and G ('y)  were unequal. 
The  anticipation  of  higher  future  values  of  income  relative  to government  spending 
when p  >  y implies  less incentive  for current  taxation.  Therefore,  the current  deficit 
increases  with  p  -  y.  Similarly,  the  expectation  that  future  government 
expenditures-say,  for social security benefits-will  increase  relative to income  should 
stimulate  current  taxation  and,  hence,  move  the government  budget  toward  surplus. 
12 Any  automatic  response  of  government  expenditure  to  income  would  be  held 
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rationale  derives  here  from efficiency  in revenue  generation  and  not 
from  stabilization  policy  considerations.13 
The  result in equation  (7) implies  that the debt-income  ratio would 
be expected  to remain  constant  on average  but would  rise in periods 
of  abnormally  high  government  spending  or abnormally  low aggre- 
gate  income.  However,  as was also true  in the  simpler  model  above, 
the  analysis does  not determine  a target or steady-state  debt-income 
ratio. The  ratio at any time reflects only the accumulation  of realized 
values  of  government  expenditure  relative  to  normal  and  income 
relative to normal,  which would  have zero mean,  ex ante, but do  not 
have to add to zero, ex post. There  is no force  that causes the ratio of 
debt  to  income  to  approach  some  target  value,  which  would  itself 
depend  on  underlying  parameters  of  the  model. 
In a more  general  model  there  may be a wide  range  within  which 
the  debt-income  ratio can  vary essentially  freely  in accordance  with 
the  shocks  shown  in  equation  (7),  but  there  may  be  some  eventual 
limits that come  into  play. A limit on the high  side would  arise when 
the debt-income  ratio rises sufficiently  to affect  the probability of the 
government's  default  (n. 3 above). On the low side, public and private 
debts  may become  less perfect  substitutes  in terms  of  liquidity  char- 
acteristics, etc., as the quantity of government  bonds  diminishes.  The 
implied  net  worth  aspect  of  public  debt-corresponding  to  some 
monopoly  power  for  the  government  in  the  sale  of  bonds-would 
then  prescribe  a target lower bound  for the debt-income  ratio. How- 
ever,  a zero value  for B does  not constitute  a necessary lower bound, 
even  if  the B  concept  is limited  to  financial  net  worth  (thereby  not 
considering  the value of governmentally  owned  real capital). There  is 
nothing  in  the  present  analysis  that  rules  out  the  possibility  of  the 
government's  becoming  a net creditor  to the  private sector.  The  last 
time  this  possibility  arose  for  the  federal  government  in the  United 
States was in  1835  when  the  national  debt  was entirely  paid off  and 
the  government  sought  desperately  (!)  for  outlets  for  its  surplus 
(Dewey  1931,  p.  221).  Apparently,  the  sharp  contraction  of  1837 
solved  this problem. 
Changes in Prices 
This  section extends  the model  to allow for changes  in the price level. 
Such changes  enter  the analysis because  the government  debt,  which 
still takes the  form  of  a one-period  bond,  is assumed  to pay interest 
and principal  in fixed  nominal  terms.  Governmental  finance  through 
13  McCallum and  Whitaker  (in press) argue  for automatic  stabilizers as a device  for 
stabilizing  the  economy  in an environment  where  information  on  aggregate  variables 
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currency  issue  is  not  considered  here,  and  any  price  changes  that 
occur  are  treated  as exogenous  with  respect  to  the  division  of  gov- 
ernmental  finance between  debt and taxes.'4 I first consider  unantici- 
pated  price  changes  and  then  deal  with  anticipated  inflation. 
A one-time  unexpected  change  in the price level can be modeled  by 
allowing the current  price level, P,,  to differ  from Po. Expectations  of 
future  price levels are assumed  at this point to be static at P,-that  is, 
Pt = PI for all t =  1, 2,....  LettingBt  denote  the stock of nominal  debt 
outstanding  at  the  end  of  period  t,  the  government's  budget  con- 
straint  from  equation  (1) is now  modified  to 
G, + r(BtuIlPt) =  Tr  +  (Bt-Bt_)IPt,  (1') 
where G and r are still in real terms, r is still assumed  to be constant, 
and Pt  = P,  X Po for all t =  1, ....  The  entire  analysis from  before 
carries through  in this case with the interpretation  of the "real initial 
debt," bo, as B(^IP. Accordingly,  in equation  (7), the dependent  vari- 
able  is now  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  debt,  (B,  -  &B)!B.  On  the 
right-hand  side  the  first variable  becomes  PJ(G1 -  G,)!BO,  while  the 
second  now involves the term, (PIG1 + rB0)1BO.  As the arbitrary length 
of  the  "period" becomes  small,  the  difference  in dating  of  the  vari- 
ables  in  these  two expressions  becomes  unimportant.  The  principal 
result here  is that one-time  changes  in the price level  (or the current 
actual  inflation  rate  in  a  continuous  time  setup)  do  not  affect  the 
change  (growth  rate) of the nominal  debt. This  conclusion  should  be 
somewhat  surprising,  since  one-time  changes  in  the  price  level  do 
alter the ratio of (real) debt to (real) income.  If the model determined 
a steady-state value of the debt-income  ratio, a shift in the actual ratio 
would  have  temporary  effects  on  the  government  deficit.  These  ef- 
fects do not arise here because  the model  does  not, in fact, determine 
this sort of  steady-state  ratio. 
To  model  anticipated  inflation,  suppose  now  that  prices  are  ex- 
pected  to change  at the constant  rate iT-that  is, P,  P=  ( 1 +  Tr)t.  The 
nominal  interest  rate is given by R  r +  Tr.  Although  it is not crucial 
for  present  purposes,  I  assume  that  the  real  rate  of  interest,  r,  is 
invariant with inflation.'5 The  previous  analysis of the choice  of taxes 
over  time  goes  through  completely  in  terms  of  real  variables- 
including r. The  only amendment  to the  previous  analysis is that the 
1  As  with the  invariance  of  the  rate of  return,  this assumption  would  be valid as a 
first-order  proposition  if government  bonds  were  not  perceived  as net  wealth  by the 
private  sector. 
" Some  theoretical-basically  indeterminate-analysis  of  this  issue  is  surveyed  in 
Barro and  Fischer (I 976,  sec. 3).  If interest  payments  are subject to tax at rate 0, then 
the after-tax real rate of return is &  =  R(I  -  0) -  ir.  Independence  of f  from 7r requires 
R  =  (i  +  ir)/(l  -  0), so that R would  have to move  more than one  to one  with 7T in this 
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government  budget  constraint  in equation  (1')  must  be  modified  to 
reflect  the  distinction  between  the  nominal  and  real interest  rate- 
that is, the  new  specification  is 
Gt + R (Bt-JlPt) =  rt +  (Bt  -  Bt_1)/P  (1") 
where R -r  +  ,r. With taxes already set at the value determined  in the 
preceding  analysis  (where  ir  =  0), it follows  that the  "extra part" of 
current  interest  payments,  ir(Bt_,IPt),  is  financed  entirely  by  extra 
issue of nominal  debt. Equivalently,  the growth  rate of nominal  debt, 
(B  -  Bt_)/Bt_1,  is raised  by the  amount  -an  amount  that  is just 
sufficient  to  offset  the  expected  effect  of  price  changes  on  the  real 
value  of the outstanding  stock of  debt. Therefore,  the incorporation 
of  the  anticipated  inflation  effect  into equation  (7) yields  the revised 
expression  for  the  growth  rate of  nominal  debt, 
(B1 -  B)/)I& =  [(1 + p)/(l  + r)]YP1(G1 -  G1)IB4  _  (8) 
-  [(1  +  p)I(1  +  r)]%[(P1G1 +  rB  )/B0  [(Yt  -  1)/fYl]  +  p  +  -1. 
Accordingly,  the  nominal  government  debt grows,  ceteris  paribus, at 
the trend growth  rate of nominal  income,  p +  -.  Note  especially  that 
it  is  the  expected  inflation  rate,  ir,  and  not  the  actual  rate  that 
influences  the  growth  rate of  nominal  debt.  The  effects  of  the  tran- 
sitory government  expenditure  and  income  variables in equation  (8) 
are the  same  as those  discussed  above. 
Changes in the Rate of Return-Market  versus Par  Value of 
Government  Debt 
Abstracting  for  convenience  from  price-level  changes,  suppose  now 
that the current  rate of return on the one-period  government  debt, r, 
differs  from  that applicable  in the previous  period,  r(1. It is assumed 
that anticipated  rates of return for future  periods  are still equal to the 
current  rate,  r.  In  the  case  of  the  one-period  debt  that  is  being 
considered,  the government's  budget  condition  of equation  (1) is now 
modified  to 
G1  + rub11  =  T1 +  (bl -be, 
Gt + rb,1 =  T1  +  (bt -  bt-1),  t-2  .  .  .  2  (1''') 
where  the b's refer  throughout  to the real par (initial) value  of  debt. 
These  conditions  can  be  shown  to  imply  that  the  overall  budget 
constraint  is altered  from  the  form  of  equation  (3) to 
[GIl(  +  r)t]  +  b'(1  +  r1)/(1  +  r)  -Yrl(1  +  r)'].  (3T) 
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The  budget  constraint  now  involves  the  market  value  of  the  initial 
debt, b  = b,(I  + ro)/(l  + r), which is expressed  as a present  value at 
date 0 by means of the date 1 discount rate. Equation (3T)  can be used to 
solve out for taxation  over time, taking into account  the constancy  of 
the  tax-income  ratio  in  the  optimal  solution.  The  result  is that  the 
previous  analysis  goes  through  if all debt  variables  instead  of  being 
measured  at par value  are measured  in terms of  market value.  Each 
market value is expressed  as a present value at the corresponding  date 
by means of the date  1 discount  rate, r. (Note  that the market value of 
debt at date  1, bi,  is equal to b, for the case of one-period  debt.)  It is 
important  to stress that the  modified  "deficit" variable that emerges 
from these calculations, b* -  b  , is not the change  in the market value 
of debt as it would customarily be measured,  but rather the difference 
in market value with the current  discount  rate, r, used  in the calcula- 
tions  for both date  I and  date  0. 
For  the  case  of  one-period,  single-coupon  debt,  the  solution  can 
readily be expressed  in terms  of  par values.  Ignoring  the  temporary 
government  expenditure  and income variables and for the case where 
the trend  growth  rates of G and Y are equal  (and  where  7T  =  0), the 
result  is 
(b,  -  bo)b( = p -  (r -  r,)( 
+ 
).  (9)  / +p 
When  r  exceeds  ro, the  market  value  bt  is below  the  par  value  bo. 
Therefore,  the achievement  of a given change  in the market value of 
debt  requires  a smaller  value  of  b1. Hence,  the  growth  rate  of  debt 
measured  at par value is related  inversely to the change  in the rate of 
return, r -  r(. Although  the analysis is complicated  by the inclusion  of 
the temporary  spending  and income variables, it seems that this effect 
of the interest-rate  change  is the main new implication  for the case of 
one-period  debt. 
In the empirically  relevant  situation  where  government  debt exists 
with different  maturity  dates  and various  coupons,  the  main part of 
the analysis continues  to go through.  In particular, equation  (3T)  still 
holds  in  terms  of  the  market  value  of  the  initial  debt  bo*,  again  ex- 
pressed  as a present  value  at date 0 by means  of  the date  1 discount 
rate, r. However,  the formula  for bd:  is substantially more complicated 
than  that  shown  in  equation  (3').  It  remains  true  that  all  previous 
results  on  debt  issue  apply  with  the  debt  variables  measured  in 
market-value  terms-expressed  as present  values  at the correspond- 
ing  date  with  r  used  as  the  discount  rate.  The  difficulty  arises  in 
relating the market-value results, which involve complicated  formulae 
for determining  bond  values,  to the readily accessible figures  on debt 
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(ro/r)b0,  be = b, -  bo +  (roIr)bo,  with ro now interpreted  as the average 
coupon  rate on  initially outstanding  debt,  the  result  in terms  of  par 
values is (b, -  bo)lbo  = p (r!r).  The  conclusion  is again that an increase 
in r above ro reduces  the growth rate of debt when expressed  in terms 
of par values. However,  the effect  now depends  on a positive value of 
p,  since  the  amount  of  debt  (at par or  market  value)  would  remain 
constant if p =  0.16  Further,  the relevant comparison  is now between r 
and  an  average  of  rates  applying  to  the  outstanding  debt,  and  the 
ratio, rI/r, appears  instead  of  the  difference,  r  -  ro. 
It seems that in the general case r would have to be compared  with a 
complicated  "average" value of past interest  rates that took account of 
both quantities  and maturities  of the existing  stock of debt.  An addi- 
tional complication  arises in using  par value figures  when  some  por- 
tion of the debt  is not issued  at par. In any case the basic result from 
this  section  is that  an  increase  in r above  the  average  of  preceding 
rates would  reduce  the growth  rate of debt when  measured  in terms 
of  par values. 
Empirical  Analysis 
An interesting  way to test the theory would be to examine  directly the 
hypothesis  that  the  planned  tax-income  ratio  was  constant.  Since 
changes  in this ratio should  then  reflect only  new information  about 
the  time  path  of  government  expenditures,  etc.,  the  theory  has the 
implication  that  changes  in  tax  rates  should  be  unpredictable  from 
knowledge  of any lagged  variables, including  prior changes  in rates. 
An  approach  for  testing  this  type  of  hypothesis  was developed  for 
analogous  propositions  about  consumption  in  Hall  (1978).  The  ap- 
proach has obvious analogues  to tests of efficient-markets  hypotheses. 
I plan to explore  this research  avenue  at a later time, but the present 
empirical  investigation  is limited  to hypotheses  and tests that directly 
concern  public  debt  movements. 
Setup of the Analysis 
The  form  of  the  systematic  part  of  the  empirical  equation  to  be 
applied  to annual  observations  is derived  from  equation  (8) as 
log  (BtIBt-1) =  a() +  al7t  +  aJ2Pt(Gt  -  G,)1Bt 
-  a3[log  (Yt/Y )(PtGt + rBK)IBOA,  (10) 
16 Some  effects  would  arise from  the  temporary  government  spending  and  income 
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where B, is the stock of nominal debt at the end of calendar year t,  Bt is 
the  average  amount  of  debt  outstanding  during  year  t,  wt  is  the 
average  anticipated  rate of  inflation  during  year t, Pt  is the  average 
price level for year t, Gt is real federal  government  expenditure  (aside 
from  interest  payments)  during  year t, Y, is aggregate  real  income 
(GNP) for year t, and Yf is the level of  normal  income  during  year t. 
From  the  perspective  of  equation  (8),  the  assumption  that  the  a- 
coefficients  in equation  (10) are constant amounts  to neglecting  varia- 
tions  in the  growth  rate p,  real interest  rate r, and  the  durations  of 
temporary  government  expenditure  and  income  (k  and  nr).  The 
theory  has the following  implications  for the coefficients.  (1) a4,:  This 
coefficient  would  equal  the  growth  rate, p,  if  real  income  and  gov- 
ernment  expenditure  grow at the same rate. However,  if government 
expenditures  are expected  to  grow  faster  than  income  for some  pe- 
riod, there would be a downward  effect on the constant as indicated  in 
a general  way from  the  (p  -  y)  term  in equation  (5).17 (2) a1: This 
coefficient  should  equal unity-the  anticipated  rate of inflation  has a 
one-to-one  effect  on  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  debt.  (3)  a2: This 
coefficient  corresponds  to [(1  +  p)l(l  +  r)]k in equation  (8), which  is 
below but close to unity. An interval of something  like (0.8,  1.0) would 
appear  to  be  a  reasonable  implication  of  the  theory.  (4)  a3:  This 
coefficient  corresponds  to [(1  +  p)I(l  +  r)]n  in equation  (8), which  is 
also below but close to unity. Again, an interval of something  like (0.8, 
1.0) appears  reasonable. 
The  model  implies  also  that certain  variables  would  be  irrelevant 
for  the  growth  rate  of  public  debt.  In  particular,  the  level  of  the 
outstanding  stock  of  debt-relative,  say,  to  the  trend  value  of 
income-is  excluded  from equation  (8). This  proposition  is tested  by 
adding  the  variable, Bt_1/(Pt_1Yt_1)-the  previous  year's ratio of  real 
debt  to normal  real income-to  the estimating  equation.  The  theory 
also  stresses  the  role  of  temporary  government  expenditure  rather 
than the  level of  spending.  (See, however,  n.  17 above  for a possible 
effect of the level.) Hence,  the effect of a variable like PtGt/Bt-normal 
government  spending  relative to the stock of debt-is  worth examin- 
ing. 
Measures of Variables 
The  present  analysis  considers  evidence  on  the  determination  of 
public  debt  in  the  United  States  since  1917.  I  hope  to  extend  the 
investigation  to earlier  dates  but have  encountered  some  data prob- 
17 An  additional  variable, PA3t1B,  could  be added  to eq.  (10)  to pick up  this effect. 
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lems. One minor difficulty is that the available public debt data before 
1916  refer  to  fiscal  years,  whereas  the  rest  of  the  analysis  is on  a 
calendar-year  basis.  A  more  serious  problem  arises in the  measure- 
ment  of  anticipated  inflation  (see  below),  which  causes  difficulties 
even  for  the  post-1916  period. 
The  quantity  of  nominal  debt, B,  is measured  as the  outstanding 
stock of interest-bearing  federal  debt at par value in the hands of the 
.  public" at the end  of each calendar  year.18  In particular,  the figures 
net  out  holdings  of  debt  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  Social  Security 
Administration,  etc.  I  have  not  carried  out  the  computations  that 
would  be  required  to adjust  the  par value  measures  for  changes  in 
rates of  return,  as discussed  above.  (Note  that a market-value  series, 
even  if it were  available, would  not be the appropriate  construct  for 
present  purposes.)  The  earlier  analysis  suggests  that  a  change-in- 
interest-rate  variable  should  then  be  added  to  equation  (10).  How- 
ever, a proper  measure  of this variable would  entail the construction 
of an appropriate  average coupon  rate on outstanding  debt. Since this 
variable has not yet been constructed,  I have limited  consideration  to 
the variable, RG6 -  RGt1,  where RG is an index  of the interest rate on 
government  bonds.  Although  there  is a hint  in the empirical  results 
that this variable enters in the hypothesized  manner,  it turns out to be 
statistically insignificant  and quantitatively  unimportant.  I am uncer- 
tain whether  refinement  of  the  measurement  of  this variable  would 
materially  affect  the  results. 
The Bt variable, which scales the values of B -  G and log (Y -Y)  in 
equation (10), is measured as V'T-t7.  Since this construction 
introduces Bt into the right-hand  side of equation  (10), I have carried 
out  the estimation  using  as instruments  the values of  the G -  G and 
log  (Y/Y) variables with Bt,  used  instead  of Bt as a scaling  factor.  It 
turns out that ordinary  least-squares  estimates  differ  negligibly  from 
these  instrumental  estimates. 
18 See the notes to table 3 below for details on the public debt variable. The  definition 
includes  fully guaranteed  securities that were issued by some New Deal agencies.  These 
amounts  are significant for 1934-44.  Debt held by federal agencies and trust funds  (but 
not  by federally  sponsored  private  corporations)  and  the  Federal  Reserve  have  been 
netted  out.  Non-interest-bearing  components  of  government  debt  are  excluded 
throughout.  No  adjustments  have  been  made  for  government  acquisitions  of  real 
capital or claims on the private sector or foreigners.  Governmental  "liability"  for future 
social security  benefits  or  other  payments  has not  been  included  in  the  definition  of 
public  debt.  It seems  that expected  future  social security  benefits  and  governmental 
acquisitions  of  capital,  etc.,  would  enter  the  present  analysis  as  they  affected  the 
anticipated  future  value  of  federal  expenditures  or  receipts.  E.g.,  the  anticipation  of 
rapid  growth  in  an  expenditure  component,  such  as  social  security  benefits,  would 
enter  the analysis as indicated  in n.  11 above.  Expenditures  on  large capital  projects, 
which  are  likely  to  represent  a  blip  in  spending,  would  tend  to  be  mostly  deficit 
financed. DETERMINATION  OF  PUBLIC  DEBT  957 
For  the  1948-76  period  I  have  constructed  an  expected  rate-of- 
inflation  variable,  ir, based  on  the  estimated  equation  for  the  GNP 
deflator in an earlier study of mine (1978). This variable, which refers 
to  the  expected  rate  of  change  of  the  GNP  deflator  over  a  1-year 
horizon,  is tabulated in table I and is discussed  in detail in the notes to 
that table. I do  not presently  have an analysis of  price determination 
before  1948 to use for the construction  of the -gvariable.  (The  World 
War II price controls  cause difficulty  for the years immediately  prior 
to  1948.)  For  the  1948-76  period  it  turns  out  that  a  long-term 
interest-rate  variable proxies  satisfactorily for  r.  Specifically, the esti- 
mated after-tax nominal  rate on corporate  bonds, R (1 -  0), where 0 is 
an estimate  of  the  tax rate,19  would  measure  the  anticipated  rate  of 
inflation (up to a constant)  over the average period  of the bonds if the 
anticipated  after-tax real rate of return were fixed.20  This interest-rate 
variable is available also for the pre-1948  period,  but the assumption 
of  a constant  anticipated  real rate of  return  over the entire  1917-76 
sample  is doubtful.  Specifically,  the  nominal  yields  (see table  1) rela- 
tive  to  actual  price  changes  during  the  inter  ar  period  are  much 
higher  than  those  since  1941.  The  likely anticipated  deflation  after 
World  War I is, in particular,  not captured  by the  interest-rate  vari- 
able for  1919-2  1. I have  presently  used  the R (1 -  0) variable for the 
1922-76  sample but have included  a dummy variable for the  1922-40 
years to allow for a different  (presumably higher)  anticipated  real rate 
of return  over that period.  I have not included  the  1917-21  years in 
the  main  analysis  although  extrapolations  of  the  estimates  to  those 
years are examined.  The  present  procedure  for  measuring  vr before 
1948  is obviously  not  satisfactory,  and  I  hope  to  construct  a  more 
appropriate  variable, especially for the planned  extension  of the anal- 
ysis to the  pre-World  War I period.21 
I have based my measurement  of normal real federal  expenditure, 
G, on the variable that worked  satisfactorily in my previous  studies  of 
19 I  have  calculated  this  rate  as  the  ratio  of  federal  plus  state  and  local  personal 
income  tax payments  to  personal  income,  although  this  measure  may underestimate 
the  average  marginal  rate  for  bondholders. 
2"  Replacing R (  -  0) by R produces  a negligible  change  in the results. The  govern- 
ment  bond  rate,  RG,  yields  basically  similar  results.  A  short-term  interest-rate 
variable-specifically,  that on  prime  commercial  paper-was  insignificant  when  used 
instead  of a long-term  rate as a proxy  for 7T  in the government  debt equation.  A likely 
interpretation  is that variations in anticipated  real rates of  return are important  in the 
short-term  rate. 
21 I have not attempted  to calculate the IT variable as a distributed  lag of actual rates of 
price change.  That  type of  relation  would  seem  much  different  over  a gold  standard 
regime  (1880-1914  and,  to a lesser  extent,  1919-33)  as compared  with a fiat money 
regime.  The  distributed  lag  of  inflation  approach  fails  especially  in  episodes  like 
1919-2  1, where  experience  appears  to be dominated  by a return  to normal  levels  of 
prices  rather  than  a continuation  of  past rates of  price  change. TABLE  1 
VALUES  OF  INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES 
log  PG *  log (Y/Y) 
'r  R(1-0)  (Y/Y)  PG/B  P(G-G)/B  B  GIY 
1916  ..  .045  -.051  ...  ...  ...  .016 
1917  .045  -070  .75  1.908  -.052  .102 
1918  .  .054  .021  .29  1.218  .006  .230 
1919  ...  .054  -.040  .21  .312  -.009  .142 
1920  ...  .060  -.110  .24  -.021  -.026  .053 
1921  ...  .059  -.226  .2 1  -.022  -.049  .052 
1922  ...  .050  -.104  .21  -.060  -.021  .039 
1923  ...  .051  -.015  .21  -.061  -.003  .037 
1924  ...  .050  -.042  .21  -.063  -.009  .034 
1925  ...  .048  .013  .22  -.059  .003  .034 
1926  ...  .047  .050  .22  -.062  .011  .033 
1927  ...  .045  .020  .23  -.059  .005  .032 
1928  ...  .045  .000  .25  -.053  .000  .033 
1929  ...  .047  .040  .25  -.084  .010  .026 
1930  ...  .045  -.084  .25  -.061  -.021  .028 
1931  .045  -.189  .24  .034  -.045  .046 
1932  .050  -.363  .20  -.013  -.073  .038 
1933  ...  .044  -.409  .18  .018  -.075  .048 
1934  ...  .040  -.359  .19  .081  -.070  .068 
1935  ...  .036  -.298  .18  .050  -.055  .067 
1936  ...  .032  -.196  .19  .086  -.037  .087 
1937  ...  .032  - .176  .20  .019  -.035  .068 
1938  ...  .031  -.243  .21  .037  -.050  .079 
1939  ...  .030  -.195  .21  .028  -.041  .081 
1940  ...  .028  -.148  .22  .032  -.032  .086 
1941  ...  .027  -.029  .24  .192  -.007  .159 
1942  ...  .027  .082  .26  .536  .021  .385 
1943  ...  .024  .206  .23  .503  .048  .549 
1944  ...  .024  .253  .23  .350  .057  .585 
194  ...  .023  .214  .22  .179  .048  .493 
1946  ...  .023  .033  .23  -.070  .008  .175 
1947  ...  .023  -.022  .26  -.110  -.006  .125 
1948  -.002  .026  -.017  .27  -.092  -.004  .133 
1949  -.002  .025  -.046  .27  -.057  -.012  .153 
19.50  .002  .024  .002  .27  -.060  .001  .143 
1951  .022  .026  .044  .30  -.007  .013  .187 
1952  .027  .026  .046  .33  .029  .016  .215 
1953  .038  .028  .049  .36  .029  .018  .221 
954  .019  .026  .001  .37  -.02i3  .000  .191 
1955  .024  .027  .030  .38  -.048  .011  .176 
1956  .0P5  .030  .016  .41  -.052  .007  .174 
1957  .010  .035  -.002  .45  -.043  -.001  .180 
1958  .010  .034  -.039  ;47  -.026  -.018  .190 
1959  .019  .039  -.016  .48  -.039  -.008  .184 
1960  .020  .039  -.029  .50  -.051  -.014  .179 
1961  .013  .039  -.039  .52  -.034  -.021  .187 
1962  .022  .038  -.019  .54  -.024  -.010  .192 
1963  .009  .038  -.015  .57  -.037  -.009  .189 
1964  .014  .040  .001  .59  -.046  .000  .186 
1965  .018  .040  .023  .62  -.053  .014  .184 
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TABLE  I  (Continued) 
PG  log  (Y/Y) 
log 
7T  R(I-0)  (Y/Y)  PG/B  P (-G)/B  B  GIY 
1966  .026  .046  .045  .68  -.011  .030  .199 
1967  .030  .049  .036  .74  .)15  .027  .213 
1968  .029  .054  .044  .80  .015  .035  .217 
1969  .035  .061  .034  .87  -.029  .030  .208 
1970  .041  .070  -.00  D  .96  -.047  -.005  .207 
1971  .050  .065  -.011  .99  -.058  -.011  .205 
1972  .062  .063  .010  1.00  -.034  .010  .211 
1973  .061  .065  .027  1.07  -  .055  .029  .220 
1974  .061  .075  -.025  1.21  -.078  -.030  .207 
1975  .060  .078  -.079  1.20  -.032  -.095  .218 
1976  .062  .074  -.055  1.08  -.044  -.059  .217 
NOTE.-It  log (P,,)-log  (P,), where log (t+,)  and log (Pf)  are predicted  and estimated  values, respectively,  of 
the GNP deflator from the equation  in Barro (1978,  eq.  13). These  calculations are based on lagged  values of money 
growth  and  the  unemployment  rate and on  contemporaneous  values of  the interest  rate and  federal  spending.  R 
from  1919 is Moody's Aaa index of corporate  bond rates and for 1916-18  is the average of Durand's yield on  10- and 
20-year  bonds,  adjusted  by +.0048  to conform  with the overlap  for  1919-21  (U.S.  Council  of  Economic  Advisers 
1977,  p. 260;  U.S. Bureau  of  the  Census  1975,  pp.  1003-4).  e  is the ratio of  federal  plus state and  local personal 
income  tax  payments  to personal  income  (U.S.  Council of  Economic  Advisers  1977,  p. 210;  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce  1976, pp. 97,  108, 334, 340-41,july  1977, pp. 31,32,  and  1973, p.  188; U.S. Bureauof  theCensus  1975, 
p.  1107). Y is real GNP  (1972  base) and P is the GNP deflator  (1972=  1.0) from  U.S. Council of  Economic  Advisers 
(1977,  pp.  188,  190):  U.S. Department  of  Commerce  (1976,  pp.  324,  349).  Figures  before  1929 are based on  data 
from ibid.  1973, series Al,  p. 182 and series B61,  p. 222.  Log (Y) is a trend value of real GNP, calculated as 1946-76: 
2.985  +.0354  1,  1915-45:  3.912  +  .02501t,  1880-1914:  3.291  +  .03591 , where t is time with  1858=1.  G is nominal 
total  federal  expenditure  divided  by  the  GNP  deflator.  Expenditure  data  are  fromn U.S.  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers  (1977,  p.  270).  Data before  1929  are  from  Firestone  (1960,  table A-3). B.,Ba  A 
money  growth  (1977,  1978). This  variable is a distributed  lag of total 
real federal  spending  using  an adaptation  coefficient  of 0.2 per year. 
The  variable has been  modified  here  to take account of the long-term 
growth rate of real federal spending,  which is estimated  as 5.6 percent 
per year-the  average  growth  rate  from  1860  to  1976.  Presumably, 
this measurement  could  be improved  by relating  the concept  of nor- 
mal spending  to the actual time-series  behavior  of the federal  spend- 
ing series. Another  problem  is that the variable includes  government 
interest  payments  as a part of  government  expenditure.  This  inclu- 
sion would  be unimportant  for the calculation  of G -  G in equation 
(10)  but  would  have  some  effect  on  the  last term  in  the  equation, 
which involves  the expression,  PG  + rB.  Essentially, it is only the real 
interest  rate  part  of  government  interest  payments  that  should  be 
included  as a part of  real government  expenditure  (see above).  The 
portion  of  interest  payments,  -B,  that  reflects  anticipated  inflation 
corresponds  also to finance  by issue of nominal  debt at rate T. These 
payments  play  no  role  in  influencing  taxes,  etc.,  and  should  be  ex- 
cluded  from the term in equation  (10). Since I believe  this considera- 
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into equation  (10), I have not attempted  to adjust government  expen- 
diture  by eliminating  a portion  of  interest  payments. 
The  departure  of income  from  normal,  log (Y!Y), is calculated  for 
the  1946-76yeriod  from  my previous  (1978)  analysis of output  (real 
GNP). Log (Y,) is calculated  along the trend line, with a growth rate of 
3.54  percent  per  year,  that  is implied  by  that  analysis.  I have  also 
calculated  a pure  trend  relation  for  real GNP  over  the  1880-1914 
period,  which reveals a strikingly similar growth  rate of 3.59  percent 
per  year.  From  1915  to  1945  (for  lack  of  a  better  procedure),  I 
connected  the fitted  trend  values  for real GNP  from  1914 and  1946 
along a constant growth line, which implied  an average growth rate of 
22  2.50  percent  per year.  The  values  of  log (Y/Y) are indicated,  along 
with  the  values  of  the PG- log  (Y!Y) variable,  in  table  1. 
Finally, the P variable is measured  by the average value of the GNP 
deflator  for  the  year. 
Empirical Results 
Table  2  describes  the  estimates  of  equation  (10)  for  various  sample 
periods.  Although  there  is an indication  that the  error variance  dur- 
ing  World  War  II  (1941-47  sample)  exceeds  that  before  1941 
(1922-40),  which exceeds  that of the recent period  (1948-76),  I have 
presently  dealt  only  with  unweighted  regressions.  The  Durbin- 
Watson statistics suggest  absence  of serial correlation  in the residuals. 
Further,  if a lagged  dependent  variable, DB,-,,  is added  to the equa- 
tion its estimated  coefficient  differs  insignificantly  from  zero  over all 
sample  periods. 
Estimates are shown  in table 2 with the coefficient  of the expected 
inflation  variable  (r  for  1948-76  or  the  R[I  -  0]  variable  for  all 
sample  periods)  unrestricted  and  with  this  coefficient  restricted  to 
equal  unity.  The  unrestricted  estimates  of  this coefficient  differ  in- 
significantly  from one  at the 5 percent  level in all cases. For example, 
for the  1948-76  period  the estimated  7i-coefficient is 1.1  2, SE =  0.22; 
while  that on R(l  -  0) is  1.32,  SE =  0.25.  A comparison  of  results 
based on the -a and R (1 - 0)  variables for this sample suggests that the 
interest-rate  variable  is a satisfactory  proxy  for  anticipated  inflation. 
Ho ever,  as noted  above, this outcome  for the post-1948  period  does 
not  guarantee  the  appropriateness  of  the  interest-rate  variable  for 
earlier  years.  For the  1922-76  sample  the  estimate  of  the R (1  -  0) 
coefficient  is  1.44,  SE =  0.28,  while  that for  the  1922-40,  1948-76 
sample  is  1.31,  SE  =  0.27.  Again,  these  estimates  do  not  differ 
22  In other  words, although  the post-World  War II growth  rate of output  (coincides 
with that from  1880-1914,  the  position  of  real GNP implied  by the  1880-1914  trend 
line  has not  been  reattained  after  the  Great  Depression  and  World  War II. xb~~~  ~~~  C)  C)  0  C  >  C)  C>  c  lr  lf 
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significantly  from  one  at  the  5  percent  level.  Since  the  theoretical 
value  of  unity  is in  accord  with  these  results,  and  since  an  (appro- 
priate)  restriction  of  this  coefficient  would  sharpen  the  remaining 
analysis,  I focus  the  subsequent  discussion  on  the  restricted  form  of 
the  government  debt  equation. 
The  1922-76  and  1922-40  1948-76  samples  indicate  a 
significantly  negative  coefficient  for a pre-1941  dummy  variable with 
a magnitude  of 0.05-0.06  per year. From the perspective  of the R (1 - 
0)  variable  as  an  expected  inflation-rate  proxy,  the  interpretation 
would  be  that  the  average  anticipated  (after-tax)  real  rate of  return 
before  1941 was higher  by 0.05-0.06  per year  than  that after  1941. 
Clearly, the interpretation  could also be that other factors reduced  the 
average  growth  rate of  nominal  debt  before  1941 by 0.05-0.06  per 
year  (or by some  part of  that  amount)  below  that  of  the  post-1941 
period.  Without  a  direct  measure  of  anticipated  inflation  it  is  not 
possible  to compare  the  constant  term  before  1941  with that of  the 
later years. However,  this difficulty  does  not prevent  a comparison  of 
the  other  coefficients  across the  different  samples. 
With the inclusion  of the  pre-1941  dummy  variable, the hypothesis 
of  a  stable  set  of  coefficients  across  the  various  sample  periods  is 
accepted.  That  is, the empirical  evidence  is in accord with a single  set 
of  coefficients  for  the  temporary  government  expenditure  and  in- 
come  variables.  The  following  F-tests  (with  5  percent  critical values 
shown  in  parentheses)23  arise  for  tests  of  the  common  coefficient 
hypothesis  for  the  indicated  samples  and  for  cases  where  the 
coefficient  of  the R (1  -  0) variable is restricted  to equal  unity.  (The 
results  are  similar  in  cases  where  the R (1  -0)  coefficient  is unre- 
stricted.) 
1941-47;  1948-76:  F3()  0.6  (2.9), 
1922-40;  1948-76:  F2=  0. 0  (3.2), 
1922-40;  1941-47;  1948-76:  F56=  1.2  (2.4), 
1922-29;  1930-40:  F3=  0.3  (3.4). 
Hence,  the results are consistent  with the hypothesis  that the response 
of government  debt  to temporary  movements  in government  spend- 
ing or in aggregate  income  has been stable since  1922. The  results are 
also consistent  with a single  constant  over the  1922-29  and  1930-40 
subsamples  and  over  the  1941-47  and  1948-76  subsamples. 
For  the  case  where  the  R (1  -  0)  variable  is  employed  with  a 
coefficient  restricted  to unity  and  for  the  1922-40,  1948-76  sample, 
the estimated  coefficient  of the temporary  federal  spending  variable, 
23  Heteroscedasticity  across the different  subperiods  would  have some effect  on these 
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P(G  -  G)!B,  is  0.78,  SE  =  0.10.  Over  the  World  War  II  sample, 
1941-47,  the  estimated  coefficient  is  1.02,  SE  =  0.10,  which  domi- 
nates the  overall sample  (1922-76)  estimate,  1.01,  SE =  0.03.  These 
estimates are in accord with the underlying  hypothesis  of a coefficient 
in  an  interval  of  roughly  (0.8,  1.0).  A  lagged  value  of  the  G  -  G 
variable  is insignificant  when  added  to the  debt  equation._ 
It is worth noting  from  table  1 that the constructed  G -  G variable, 
which  incorporates  a trend  growth  rate  of  5.6  percent  per  year,  is 
negative  except  for  wartime  years  (1917-19,  1941-45,  1952-53, 
1967-68)  and the  period  of  rapid government  expansion  during  the 
Great  Depression  (1931  and  1933-40).  The  temporary  government 
spending  variable  can  average  to zero,  ex  ante,  only  if expenditure 
bulges  associated  with large wars are offset  by a much larger number 
of  years  with  small  negative  values.  Hence,  the  typical  peacetime 
value (1920-30  and  1946-76  except  for  1952-53  and  1967-68  in the 
present  sample)  shows a negative  value  of the G -  G variable, which 
produces  a declining,  rather than a constant,  debt-income  ratio as the 
normal  peacetime  pattern.  In this respect  the ratio of debt to normal 
income,  as shown  in table  3,  declined  from  a peak  value  of  0.29  in 
1919  to  a trough  of  0.15  in  1930  (before  rising  during  the  Depres- 
sion),  and  declined  from  a peak value  of  1.33 in  1945 to a trough  of 
0.19 in 1974 (before  rising slightly to 0.23  in 1976). The  basic pattern 
of peacetime  decline  in the debt-income  ratio appears similar after the 
two world wars, although  the starting ratio is much lower in 1919 than 
in  1945,  and  the  period  following  World  War  I  contains  a  much 
smaller  number  of  non-Depression,  peacetime  years  than  that  fol- 
lowing  World  War II.  The  period  following  the  Civil War seems  to 
exhibit  the same general  pattern as that following  the two world wars. 
The  peak debt-nominal  income  ratio (based on June  figures  for the 
public debt)  was about  0.25  in  1866 and  declined  from  there  over  a 
long,  almost  entirely  peacetime  period  to a trough  of  0.02  in  1916. 
The  G  -  G variable,  as measured  in  the  present  analysis,  would  be 
negative  throughout  the 1866-1916  period except  for a small positive 
value  in  1892  and  for  the  years  of  the  Spanish-American  War, 
1898-99. 
The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  temporary  income  variable,  log 
(Y/Y)  PGIB,  over  the  1922-76  sample  is  -1.67,  SE  =  0.14.  (A 
lagged  value of this variable is insignificant  if added  to the equation.) 
The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  log  (YIY) variable  significantly  ex- 
ceeds  in magnitude  the value,  1.0, that appears  as the upper  limit of 
the  ex ante  interval on  this coefficient.  Hence,  there  is an indication 
that  the  magnitude  of  typical  countercyclical  debt  response  has  ex- 
ceeded  the amount  that would be dictated purely from efficient  public 
finance  considerations.  There  is,  however,  no  indication  that  this TABLE  3 
ACTUAL  AND  ESTIMATED  VALUES  OF  PUBLIC  DEBT 
1922-76  EQUATION,  1948-76  EQUATION, 
R (1-0)  COEFFICIENT=  1  IT-COEFFICIENT=  1 
DB  DB  DIB  DB  DBR  B  B/(Y-P) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1916  ...  ...  .  ..  .91  .02 
1917  2.040  (1.976)  (.065)  ...  ...  7.0  .11 
1918  1.075  (1.203)  (-1.29)  ...  ...  20.5  .26 
1919  .166  (.331)  (-.165)  ...  ...  24.2  .29 
1920  -.038  (.036)  (-  .074)  ...  ...  23.3  .24 
1921  -.039  (.071)  (-. 1 10)  ...  22.4  .27 
1922  -.036  -.020  -.017  ...  ...  21.6  .26 
1923  -.038  -.051  .014  ...  ...  20.8  .24 
1924  -.049  -.045  -.004  ...  ...  19.8  .23 
1925  .000  -.062  .062  ...  ...  19.8  .22 
1926  -.112  -.080  -.032  ...  ...  17.7  .19 
1927  -.064  -.067  .003  ...  ...  16.6  .18 
1928  -.049  -.054  .005  ...  ...  15.8  .16 
1929  -.059  -.101  .042  ...  ...  14.9  .15 
1930  -.007  -.027  .020  ...  ...  14.8  .15 
1931  .084  .107  -.023  ...  ...  16.1  .18 
1932  .123  .111  .012  ...  ...  18.2  .22 
1933  .162  .142  .020  ...  ...  21.4  .26 
1934  .167  .189  -.022  ...  ...  25.3  .27 
1935  .177  .131  .046  ...  ...  30.2  .31 
1936  .104  .132  -.028  ...  ...  33.5  .33 
1937  .029  .062  -.033  ...  ...  34.5  .32 
1938  .043  .105  -.062  ...  ...  36.0  .33 
1939  .070  .079  -.009  ...  ...  38.6  .35 
1940  .072  .066  .006  ...  ...  41.5  .36 
1941  .245  .242  .003  ...  ...  53.0  .41 
1942  .583  .536  .047  ...  ...  94.9  .65 
1943  .407  .454  -.047  ...  ...  142.6  .91 
1944  .301  .288  .012  ...  .  192.6  1.18 
1945  .170  .133  .036  ...  ...  228.2  1.33 
1946  -.097  -.047  -.050  ..  ...  207.2  1.02 
1947  -.030  -.064  .034  ...  ...  201.0  .84 
1948  -.038  -.046  .008  -.037  -.001  193.6  .74 
1949  .035  .001  .034  -  .001  .035  200.4  .74 
1950  -.014  -.024  .010  -.02  1  .007  197.6  .69 
1951  -.018  .008  -.027  .009  -.027  194.0  .61 
1952  .019  .041  -.022  .033  -.014  197.7  .60 
1953  .019  .040  -.021  .040  -.021  201.5  .58 
1954  .013  .012  .001  .017  -.004  204.1  .56 
1955  .000  -.027  .026  -.011  .011  204.0  .53 
1956  -.029  -.020  -.010  -.013  -.016  198.1  .48 
1957  -.001  .006  -.017  .000  -.011  195.9  .44 
1958  .033  .051  -.019  .041  -.009  202.4  .43 
1959  .035  .025  .009  .024  .011  209.6  .42 
1960  -.014  .025  -.039  .029  -.043  206.6  .40 
1961  .022  .052  -.029  .044  -.021  211.3  .39 
1962  .018  .044  -.026  .040  -.021  215.2  .37 
1963  .006  .028  -.022  .016  -.011  216.4  .36 
1964  .008  .006  .002  -.001  .008  218.1  .34 
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TABLE  3 (Continued) 
1922-76  EQUATION,  1948-76  EQUATION, 
R(1-6)  COEFFICIENT=  1  Xr-COEFFICIENT=  I 
A  A 
DB  DB  DBR  DB  DBR  B  B!(Y-P) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1965  -.009  -.023  .014  -.025  .016  216.1  .32 
1966  -.006  -.004  -.001  -.021  .015  214.9  .30 
1967  .018  .031  --.013  .006  .012  218.9  .29 
1968  .030  .023  .007  -.009  .039  225.6  .27 
1969  -.025  -.005  -.020  -.021  -.004  220.0  .24 
1970  .036  .044  -.008  .035  .001  228.0  .23 
1971  .076  .038  .038  .048  .028  246.1  .23 
1972  .057  .025  .032  .038  .019  260.5  .22 
1973  -.003  -.027  .023  -.011  .007  259.6  .20 
1974  .039  .060  -.021  .081  -.042  269.9  .19 
1975  .255  .217  .038  .224  .032  348.4  .21 
1976  .159  .141  .018  .154  .006  408.5  .23 
SOURCES,-From 1916 to  1938, Board of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  1943, pp.  509-12  and  issues 
of  the Federa  Reserve  Bulletin  (for holdings  by  the Federal Reserve).  From  1939 to  1976,  U.S. Council of  Economic 
Advisers  1970, p. 255,  1976. p. 253.  1977, pp. 274-75:  Treasut  Bulletn  (June  1977), p. 68;  Board  off  governors  of' 
the Federal Reserve System  1976, pp. 868,  869.  882. BW(Y  P) is the ratio of B to the nominal  value of trend GNP. See 
table 3  for  the  definitions  of  tand P. 
NotE.-  -  =_log (B,)-log (B,-) ID  in col. 2 is the estimated  value from the  1922-76  equation  with the R(l-0) 
coefficient constrained to equal one; in col. 4 ai is the estocated  value from the  1948-76  equation with the  r-coeffident 
constrained  to  equal  one.  DBR  -1 :3-19,  B  is  the  end-of-year  value  in  billions  of  dollars  of  privately  held 
interest-bearing  public debt at nominal  )'  salt.i l.te  gross dIt  includes  fully guaranteed  securities  issued by the 
Federal  Home  Mortgage  Corporation,  Home  0w ens  rLoan  (corptration.  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation, 
Commodity  Credit  Corporation,  U.S.  Housing  A thority  and  Federal  Housing  Administiration.  The  amounts  of 
these  issues  are  significant  from  1934-44.  Non-imterest-bearing  debt  has been  excluded.  The  figures  are  net  of 
holdings  by the  Federal  Reserve  and  government  agencies  and  trust  funds. 
behavior  is  a  recent  phenomenon.  In  particular,  the  estimated 
coefficient  of the temporary  income variable over the  1922-40  sample 
is  -1.97,  SE =  0.39.  Although  the  pre-Depression  years,  1922-29, 
are  a  part  of  this  sample,  it  is  clear  from  the  separate  coefficient 
estimate  and  standard  error  for  this  period,  -1.18,  SE  =  1.27,  that 
only a moderate  amount  of information  on this coefficient  is provided 
by the addition  of these data. A meaningful  test for a shift in counter- 
cyclical debt  response  beginning  wxith the  New  Deal  would  have  to 
bring in earlier evidence  from  the Gold Standard  period.24 I plan to 
carry out  this extension  at a later time. 
The  estimated  constant  term  for  the  1922-76  sample  (with  the 
coefficient  of the R [1 -  0] variable restricted  to unity) is 0.0 12, SE = 
.005.  (Since  the  dummy  variable  applies  to the  1922-40  period,  the 
24  One suggested  explanation  for the "excessive" countercyclical  debt response  is that 
it reflects  the  cross-sectional  graduation  of  income  tax  rates,  which  might  affect  the 
time-series  relation  of  taxes  to income  if there  were  substantial  adjustment  costs  for 
changing  tax laws over the business cycle. Under  this interpretation,  the countercyclical 
response  would  be weaker  during  the  pre-World  War 1, non-income  tax period. 966  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
constant for these years would be 0.012  -  0.059  =  -0.047.)  Theoreti- 
cally, with the value of R (1 -  0) rather than ir held  fixed, the constant 
should  correspond  to  the  difference  between  p,  the  growth  rate  of 
real GNP,  and the  anticipated  after-tax  real rate of return.  Since the 
average  growth  rate of  real GNP  from  1922  to  1976  was 0.032  per 
year, the constant  corresponds  to an anticipated  after-tax  real rate of 
return  for  the  post-1941  period  of  0.020  per  year.25 
The Level of Debt 
The  theory  predicts  that  the  level  of  debt  or  the  debt-income  ratio 
would be irrelevant for current  debt issue. I have tested this proposi- 
tion by adding  the variable, B,_1/(Pt_,Yt_),  to the estimating  equation. 
The  estimated  coefficient  of  this variable differs  insignificantly  from 
zero  in  all  cases-for  example,  over  the  1922-76  period  with  the 
coefficient  of the R (1 -  0) variable restricted  to unity,  the  estimated 
coefficient  is -0.012,  SE =  0.018.  This  result supports  the surprising 
proposition  of the theory  that the debt-income  ratio does  not have a 
i'target'  value  but rather  moves  'randomly"  in accordance  with the 
realizations  for  the  federal  expenditure  and  income  shocks. 
Level of Federal Spending 
The  theory  stresses  the role  of  temporary  government  expenditure, 
as opposed  to the level of spending  (see, however,  n. 17 above). If the 
variable,  P,G,/Bt  is  added  to  the  debt  equation,  its  estimated 
coefficient  differs  insignificantly  from  zero in all cases.  For example, 
over the  1922-76  sample  with the coefficient  of the R (I  -  0) variable 
again restricted to one, the estimated  coefficient  is 0.022,  SE = 0.01 7. 
Change in Interest Rate 
An increase  in interest  rates should  reduce  the growth  rate of public 
debt  when measured  at par values (see above).  For the case where  the 
R (1 -  0) coefficient  is constrained  to one and for the  1922-76  sample, 
the estimated  coefficient  of  the variable, RG,  -  RG,-,  is -0.7,  SE = 
1.3. A failure  to isolate  a significant  effect  of  this variable may stem 
from  improper  measurement,  since RG_,  should  be replaced  by an 
25 However,  over  the  1948-76  period  with the  ir variable  held  fixed,  the estimated 
constant  is 0.015,  SE  =  0.007,  which  is  well below  the  growth  rate of  real  GNP.  A 
possible  interpretation  is  that  the  anticipated  real  rate  of  return  for  the  post-1941 
period is actually  close to zero, and that the constant is below the growth rate because of 
the expectation  that government  spending  will rise faster  than  income  over  time  (see 
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appropriately  weighted  average  of past coupon  rates. Therefore,  the 
effect  of  this variable  may be  worth  further  examination. 
The Experience of Debt Issue  from 1917  to 1976 
Table  3 contains  values  for  the actual growth  rate of nominal  public 
debt,  DB,  since  1917.  Estimated  values  and  residuals  from  the 
1922-76  equation  (with the coefficient  of the R 1[ -  0] variable set to 
one  and  with  the  estimates  extrapolated  to  1917-21)  and  from  the 
1948-76  equation  with the coefficient  of the ir-variable set to one  are 
also  indicated.  Values  of  the  independent  variables  used  in  the  es- 
timating  equations  are  shown  in  table  1. 
The  extrapolation  of  the  1922-76  equation  captures  well  the  ex- 
traordinarily  high  growth  rates  of  public  debt  (starting  from  a low 
base  of  less  than  $1  billion  of  debt  in  1916)  during  World  War  I, 
1917-18.  The  equation  substantially overestimates  the growth rate of 
debt  from  1919  to  1921.  I  suspect  that  this  underestimation  arises 
because a strong anticipated  deflation  after the war is not captured  by 
the  interest-rate  variable.  However,  this conjecture  cannot  be  tested 
without  a direct  measure  of  anticipated  inflation. 
The  1922-29  period  exhibits  negative  values  of  DB,  which  are 
consistent  with the  negative  values  of G -  G during  this period  and 
with the absence of any important  economic  contraction  from  1923 to 
1929.  The  strongly  positive  growth  rates of  debt  from  1931  to  1940 
reflect,  first,  the  countercyclical  response  to  the  depression  (with  a 
peak  effect  from  1932  to  1934)  and,  second,  the  impact  of  a sharp 
increase in federal  spending,  especially  from  1934 to 1936. The  value 
of  +0.08  for  the  P(G  -  G)IB variable  in  1934,  as contrasted  with 
-0.08  for  1929,  implies,  by  itself,  that  the  value  of  DAB for  1934 
exceeds  that  for  1929  by  0.26  per  year.  The  even  sharper  rise  in 
federal  spending  during  World War II accounts  for the vast increase 
in debt  for  1941-45. 
The  first years of  the  post-World  War II  period,  1946-48,  show 
negative  growth  rates  of  debt,  which  are  associated  with  the  sharp 
cutback in federal  spending.  This  pattern is interrupted  by the  1949 
recession  but is resumed  in  1950. The  expansion  of federal  spending 
associated  with the Korean  War, especially  in  1952-53,  is reflected  in 
higher  growth  rates  of  debt.  The  1954  recession"  is  offset  by  a 
substantial drop in the federal  spending  variable to produce  a moder- 
ate growth rate of debt for that year. Throughout  the period from  1955 
to 1965, the relatively slow growth in federal  spending  (relative to the 
average  since  1860 of 5.6 percent  per year) is a factor that lowers the 
growth  of  debt. 
The  boom  in  1955  produces  an  estimated  value  L)  of  -0.027, 968  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
although  the actual value of zero is substantially higher.  From  1956 to 
1958 the values of DB are below the estimated  values-in  particular, 
the  expansion  of  debt  during  the  1958  contraction  is less  vigorous 
than  would  have  been  expected.  This  pattern  of  weaker  than  ex- 
pected  debt  expansion  applies  also to  the  1960-63  period.  This  re- 
lationship  is reversed  for  1964-65-apparently  reflecting  the positive 
effect  on debt issue of the celebrated  1964-65  tax cuts. However,  the 
residual from the  1922-76  equation  for  1964 is only 0.004.  The  1965 
residual,  0.014,  shows  a  more  substantial  effect.  An  expansionary 
factor for  1967-68  is the rise in federal  spending  associated  with the 
Vietnam  War. An interesting  note about the  1968 observation  is that 
it shows a positive residual,  which confirms  the general  belief that the 
"  tax  surcharge"  for  that  year  was quantitatively  trivial.  However,  a 
negative  residual  does  appear  for  1969. 
During  the  1970s the federal  spending  variable is again a negative 
contributor  to the  growth  of  debt.  However,  the  anticipated  rate of 
inflation  becomes  a significant  positive  element  during  this period- 
r rises from 0.014  in 1964 to 0.030  in 1967 and from 0.029  in 1968 to 
0.062  in  1972, remaining  at about 6 percent  per year through  1976; 
the interest-rate  variable, R (1 -  0), rises steadily from 0.040  in 1964 to 
0.070  in  1970,  and  then  varies  between  0.063  and  0.078  for  the 
1970-76  period.  For the  early  1970s  the expected  inflation  factor is 
substantially offset  only by the strong boom in 1973, which produces  a 
single year of negative growth in the nominal debt. The  recession  that 
begins  in  1974 returns  the growth rate of debt to the positive range. 
The  vast debt  explosion  for  1975-76  has been  widely  noted.  It is 
therefore  of interest that the present analysis seems to account fbr this 
behavior reasonably well-the  1922-76  equation  yields a value for 4P 
of  0.22,  as compared  with an actual value of  0.26.  For  1976  the DB 
value is 0.14,  as compared  with an actual value of 0.16.  It is important 
to note  that the  federal  spending  variable is not  an element  in these 
high  values  of  debt  growth.  The  major  contributor  is  the  strong 
recession  (output  8 percent  below  trend  in  1975),  which  produces  a 
value of  the pertinent  variable, log (Y/Y) * PG/B,  for  1975 that is the 
highest  magnitude,  0.095,  of  the entire  1922-76  sample!  The  effect 
of a given  proportionate  shortfall of income  (in this case by 8 percent) 
on debt  issue depends  multiplicatively  on the normal  level of  federal 
spending,  because the product  of log (Y/Y) and G indicates  (if G=  G) 
the amount  by which  real taxes  would  be reduced  if the  tax-income 
ratio were to be kept constant.  Because  the value of C is much  higher 
in  1975  than  during  the  depth  of  the  Great  Depression  in  1933 
(where log [Y/Y] =  -0.40),  the smaller percentage  output  shortfall in 
1975 is converted  into a larger overall effect  on debt issue. According 
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raises I$  by 0.16  per year (relative to a situation in which log [YIY] = 
0)-that  is, it accounts  for $47  billion out of  the total debt increment 
during  1975 of  $78  billion.  The  second  positive  element  for  1975  is 
the  high  anticipated  rate of  inflation  (r  =  0.060),  which  affects  the 
value of DB on a one-to-one  basis and thereby accounts  for $17 billion 
of  debt  issue  (relative  to a situation  where  7T =  0). 
For  1976  the  reduced  value  of 1a  reflects  principally  the  smaller 
magnitude  of the temporary-income  variable. The  value of ir (0.062) 
remains  high  for  this  year. 
It may be of interest to carry out a formal test of the hypothesis  that 
the  apparent  debt  explosion  for  1975-76  is consistent  with  earlier 
experience.26  A test that the  1975-76  observations conform  with those 
from  1922  to  1974  yields  the  statistic, F29  =  1.9,  5  percent  critical 
value =  3.2. Therefore,  the hypothesis  of an unchanged  structure for 
1975-76  is accepted  by this test. An extrapolation  of an equation  that 
is estimated  over the  1922-74  period  yields values  for  1975 of 15)  = 
0.196,  residual  =  0.059;  and  for  1976  of  153 =  0.127,  residual  = 
0.032.  Hence,  the  observed  values  of D13 for  1975-76  are above  the 
extrapolated  estimates  from  the  1922-74  experience,  but  not  sig- 
nificantly  so. 
Concluding  Remarks 
Natural  extensions  to  the  present  analysis  of  public  debt  behavior 
have  been  noted  in  parts  of  the  discussion  above.  Theoretical  pos- 
sibilities include  the incorporation  of currency  issue, a rigorous  appli- 
cation  of  optimal  taxation  theory  to public debt  determination  (n.  7 
above), and an explicit  treatment  of uncertainty  about future  govern- 
ment  spending,  national  income,  and  so on.  On an empirical  level  it 
would  be  useful  to improve  the  measure  of  anticipated  inflation  to 
include  a proper  treatment  of  change-in-interest-rate  effects,  to test 
directly  propositions  concerning  the  unpredictability  of  federal  tax 
rate  changes,  and  to  extend  the  analysis  to  earlier  U.S.  data.  An 
investigation  of  the  debt-creation  process  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
which is currently  being carried out by Benjamin  and Kochin  (1978), 
should  provide  interesting  comparative  evidence. 
I have also begun  a study that utilizes the present  analysis to exam- 
ine  the  effects  of  shifts  between  public  debt  and  taxes  on  economic 
activity.  This  analysis stresses the distinction  between  customary  debt 
movements-which  may be measurable  as the estimated  value from a 
public debt equation-and  the surprise  part of these  shifts. Theoreti- 
26 A  difficulty  with this  test  is that  it is motivated  entirely  by  the  observation  of  a 
"high" realized value of DB. The  statistical properties  of the usual tests would  therefore 
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cally, the latter parts would have a stronger impact on output-in  fact, 
the  former  parts  would  be  neutral  in  some  models.  However,  my 
preliminary  results  have  not  isolated  important  output  effects  of 
either  component  of public debt movements.  The  public debt theory 
developed  in the present  paper suggests  a possible difficulty  in isolat- 
ing  the  business-cycle  effects  of  the  temporary  tax changes  that  are 
associated  with the usual view of  fiscal policy.  If the  theory  has some 
empirical validity, so that the principal movements  in federal  tax rates 
have,  in  fact, represented  permanent  changes-in  the sense  that fu- 
ture  changes  in  rates  were  unpredictable-then  the  historical  data 
would  not  provide  much  evidence  about  the  impact  of  temporary 
changes  in federal  taxes. 
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